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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the causal relationship between 
intergovernmental transfers and fiscal effort. Empirical evidence from 
Peruvian municipalities supports a negative relation. The substitution effect is 
decreasing on the level of municipalities’ expenditure and tends to disappear 
for high-expenditure localities. Given this phenomenon, devolving 
responsibilities to sub-national governments might reduce fiscal effort and 
deteriorate fiscal balance especially among localities with lower fiscal 
capacity. A possible solution might be the inclusion of fiscal effort indicators 
in the intergovernmental transfer design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Devolving responsibilities to local governments has become an important 
component of development programs. Developing local capacities and 
augmenting local government’s role is viewed as one way to enhance the 
responsiveness of governments to local needs (Faguet 2004). Because local 
governments are closer to their constituencies, they react better to local 
demands and their behavior is easily observed. According to this argument, 
local participation may increase allocation efficiency (Oates 1972). Local 
officials will provide public goods demanded by the community instead of 
just following central government policies.  
Nonetheless, decentralization is not exempt from problems. Inequality 
between poor and rich communities may grow, production of local goods 
may be more costly and if sub-national fiscal deficits are not controlled, it 
might lead to higher macroeconomic instability (Prud'homme 1994). 
Furthermore, the effect of decentralization on corruption is unclear (Bardhan 
2002; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Treisman 2002). Local governments may be more 
easily captured by elites increasing the risk of corruption. On the other hand, 
closeness of local officials to electors may facilitate monitoring and 
supervision. These possible side-effects are more relevant in poor, highly 
unequal countries. For example, in the Peruvian case, most local governments 
lack fiscal capacity and management skills and are highly dependant of 
central government transfers (Aráoz and Urrunaga 1996; Casas 1997; 
Alvarado, Rivera et al. 2003). 
According to traditional fiscal federalism theories, intergovernmental 
transfers can be used to reduce problems associated to decentralization like 
inequality, externalities and poor quality of local public goods (Oates 1972). It 
is not surprising then that intergovernmental transfers are an essential part of 
any fiscal decentralization process. However, inadequate transfer designs 
may disincentive efficient use of resources or reduce fiscal effort. 
This paper explores the relationship between intergovernmental 
transfers and local fiscal effort. In order to analyze it, a theoretical model is 
developed. Then the causal relationship is evaluated using an empirical 
model with data from Peruvian local governments. 
What is the effect of transfers on fiscal effort? The model developed in 
this paper suggests that the relationship is negative and decrease with the 
initial level of local public expenditure. Then, an increase in transfers will 
reduce fiscal effort. Given decreasing marginal benefits, the trade-off between 
transfers and fiscal effort is higher in local governments with low levels of 
local expenditure.  
The implications of the model are tested using socioeconomic and 
financial data from about 1,400 Peruvian district municipalities. The 
identification of the relationship between transfers and fiscal effort is 
complicated due to non-random transfer allocation and the presence of 
omitted variables. Firstly, given the equalization objective of the transfer 
system, communities with poor tax bases will receive more funds. Secondly, 
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there are many unobservable relevant variables like fiscal capacity, 
management skills, organization, etc.  In any case, simply regressing local tax 
collection on transfers would produce inconsistent estimators. 
This paper exploits a quasi experiment and panel data to address these 
identification problems. In 2001, an additional transfer (“asignación adicional”) 
was conferred to Peruvian local governments receiving a minimum level of 
Foncomun (“Fondo de Compensación Municipal” or Municipal Compensation 
Fund) regardless of local tax collection or total expenditure. Participation in 
this program can be used as an instrumental variable since it explains 
increases on transfers but it is not correlated to local tax collection. As shown 
below, low and high tax collection municipalities are similarly distributed 
among treated and not treated groups. On the other hand, the model in first 
differences, exploiting panel data on treated and untreated municipalities, 
allows dropping out time-invariant unobservable variables. 
The results from the empirical models confirm the existence of a 
negative relationship between transfers and local fiscal effort. In the Peruvian 
case, the elasticity of substitution is around -1.0. As predicted by the model, 
the effect of transfers on local effort decreases with the level of per capita 
expenditure of the local government. The reduction of fiscal effort is higher 
among local governments with lower levels of expenditure. As long as 
expenditure level increases, the effect tends to disappear. 
These results are especially relevant in a context of growing 
participation of local governments. Delegating competences implies 
increments of local financial resources. This fiscal decentralization may 
involve creation or delegation of tax bases as well as transfers from central 
government. Redistribution of competences may increase allocation 
efficiency; however it may also disincentive fiscal effort. This situation might 
increase the degree of dependence of central governments and deteriorate 
fiscal balance. The effects might be worse among poorer communities, which 
are nowadays the most dependants on resources from the central 
government. 
Reducing transfers is not a reasonable solution. Intergovernmental 
transfers play a substantial role to reduce inequality, to assure certain 
minimum level of local public goods and to incentive efficiency allocation of 
resources in a decentralized environment (Oates 1972).  An alternative policy, 
suggested by the theoretical model, is the inclusion of conditions in the 
transfer assignment scheme. In particular, allocating certain proportion of 
transfers based on local fiscal effort indicators might increase effort and local 
tax collection. 
This paper is organized in six sections including the present 
introduction. Section 2 presents a survey of empirical literature related to 
identification of the effect of transfers on fiscal effort. Special attention is 
given to Latin-American cases such as Colombia, Mexico and Peru. In section 
3, a model is built to analyze the relationship between transfers and fiscal 
effort. A simple 1-period political maximization setup is assumed. Section 4 
 2 
discusses the identification problems and the strategy used to deal with it. 
Section 5 and 6 present the results and conclusions respectively. 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Fiscal federalism literature emphasizes two explanations of the effect of 
transfers on fiscal effort. The first one is based on the assumption of rational 
benefit maximization. According to this approach, transfer of additional 
resources reduces fiscal effort because of a substitution effect. Since local 
governments do not internalize costs of taxes collected to finance transfers, it 
is optimal for them to substitute local costly taxation with transfers (Peterson 
1997). The limitation with this approach is that it assumes that local 
expenditure is fixed. In this case, the local governments are only reallocating 
their funding portfolio, choosing the cheaper source.  
An alternative explanation is based on the flypaper effect. This 
phenomenon is based on some empirical evidence proposing that the increase 
of expenditure is higher when financed by unconditional aid than by own 
resources (Hines and Thaler 1995).  This anomaly can be related to budget-
maximizing public officials who are not subject to electoral competition and 
with uninformed voters (Filimon, Romer et al. 1982). In this case, 
expenditures might increase more than additional resources due to transfers; 
the fiscal gap should be filled using debt or levying additional taxes. 
It is a common place in fiscal decentralization literature to consider the 
existence of a relationship between transfers and fiscal effort. However, there 
is still no consensus regarding its direction or magnitude. The available 
empirical evidence is not conclusive and in same cases, it is contradictory 
(Litvack, Ahmad et al. 1998). Most of analyses of the effect of transfers on 
fiscal effort are based on descriptive statistics like comparing evolution of tax 
collection and intergovernmental transfer (Cabrero and Orihuela 2000). On 
the other hand, the use of econometric models has been limited by data 
availability and has been concentrated in developed countries such as United 
States, Canada and Germany (Gramlich 1987; Bird 1994).  
In the case of Latin American countries, Colombia and Mexico are the 
most studied decentralization process. In both cases, the increase of transfers 
and responsibilities to sub-national governments were significant. Bird (1994) 
finds evidence of a strong correlation between transfers and local 
expenditures reduction in Colombian transfers programs. He concludes that 
receptor communities reduced their fiscal effort due to transfers. This result is 
consistent with Correa and Steiner (1999) who find evidence of “fiscal apathy” 
at sub-national level in Colombia. Their estimates suggest that 96% of 
transfers are used to reduce local taxes and only 4% is allocated to increase 
local expenditures. 
Nevertheless, these results are not robust to changes of the time span of 
analysis. For instance, Garzón (1997) examines the period before and after the 
increase of transfer (1986 and 1996). He does not find evidence of reduction in 
general tax collection among Colombian municipalities. In the same line, 
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Jaramillo (1999) rejects the hypothesis of fiscal laziness. He finds that while 
transfers were augmenting, the participation of local governments on national 
tax collection increased from 9% to 13%.  
Other studies support or reject the hypothesis that transfers reduced 
fiscal effort in Colombia (Ferreira and Valenzuela 1993; Fainboim, Acosta et 
al. 1994; Wiesner 1994; Vargas and Sarmiento 1997). However, as Bird and 
Fiszbein (1998) pointed, due to inappropriate use of data or identification 
methodology, many of them seem flawed. 
In the case of Mexico, Nickson (2001) and Cabrero and Orihuela (2000) 
find evidence that increments of transfers were associated to reductions in 
fiscal effort. During 1980´s, local tax collection was static and local deficits 
increased. The deficit increment occurred even though the Mexican transfer 
system includes matching grants designed to incentive local fiscal effort. In 
addition, Raich (2001) finds a negative relationship between transfers and 
fiscal effort when analyzing the impact of a transfer to municipalities of 
Puebla (FAISM, “Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal”). 
He concludes that the transfer reduced local tax collection and that the effect 
was greater among the less populated and poorer municipalities. 
In the Peruvian case, previous studies find evidence of a negative 
relationship between transfers and fiscal effort of municipalities (Alvarado 
1994; Alvarado, Rivera et al. 2003). The estimated substitution elasticity varies 
among -0.23 and -0.35. However, the estimation procedures do not consider 
solution for reverse causality and omitted variables problems that might lead 
to inconsistent estimations. 
 
3. THE MODEL1 
 
Consider a local administration or mayor who can finance local expenditures 
with local taxes T or with transfers from central government Tr. For 
simplicity, assume that the local government can not save or borrow. Then, all 
available resources are spent. 
 
 TrTG +=  
Local taxation depends on the effort of the mayor e. Let’s assume the 
following linear specification ( ) eeT γ= , where 0>γ  measures the relation 
between effort and taxation. Notice that other variables can be included such 
as fiscal capacity or legal institutions. Nevertheless, these changes do not 
modify the results of the model.  
The transfers have two components. A fixed component F that is 
assigned considering equalization criteria and a conditional component 
directly linked to local tax effort eα , where 0≥α  measures how important is 
                                                 
1 The basic setup of this model is similar to other models related to incentives of local 
authorities to provide public goods such as Zhuravskaya (2000). 
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local effort in the assignment formula2. Let’s assume that effort is observable 
by the central government. Thus, the transfers received are equal to: 
 
eFTr α+=  
 
Effort can increase taxation and transfers if 0>α . Nonetheless, effort is 
costly for the mayor. In particular it is assumed that cost of effort is , 
. This specific functional form is used for simplicity; any convex and 
increasing function would produce the same result. 
25.0 ce
0>c
According to the level of local expenditure, the mayor receives a political 
revenue R(G) which can be interpreted as more popularity, more support for 
future political appointments or higher reelection probability.  The political 
revenue function is increasing and concave. For simplicity, a Cobb-Douglas 
function is used. 
 
( ) δβGGR =  , 0>β , 10 ≤< δ  
 
The mayor’s problem is to choose a level of effort to maximize the net benefits 
(political revenues minus cost of effort). ( ) 25.0 ceGRMax
e
− . The first order 
condition yields the following optimal effort level: 
 
=*e ( ) δβδγα −×+ 11Gc  
 
Since , effort is decreasing on transfers. Higher transfers 
increases local public expenditure, it reduces marginal political revenues and 
disincentives fiscal effort. Then, a negative relation between transfers and 
fiscal effort exists. Moreover, given the concavity of the political revenue 
function, the negative relationship between transfers and effort will decrease 
with the initial level of local expenditure
TrTG +=
3. Thus, the higher the level of initial 
expenditure, the lower will be the trade-off between transfers and fiscal effort 
(see Figure 1). These two implications are testable and will be used in the 
present paper. 
Notice that this result does not imply that poorer communities will show 
less fiscal effort than richer ones. Actually, assuming the same underlying 
preferences and costs, the model predicts that local governments with lower 
levels of expenditure will choose higher levels of effort than richer 
communities.  
                                                 
2 This “effort component” is currently not incorporated in Peruvian transfer system, but it is 
included in the model in order to analyse its effect in local tax effort. 
3 Given the assumptions, ( ) ( ) 01 2* <−+=∂
∂ −
c
G
Tr
e δδβδγα  and  
( ) ( )( ) 021 32
*2
>−−+=∂
∂ −
c
G
Tr
e δδδβδγα . Similar results can be obtained with any other concave 
function of political revenues. 
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The model has two relevant policy implications. Firstly, fiscal 
decentralization might reduce local tax collection. Given low fiscal capacity, 
fiscal decentralization usually involves increments in transfers to local 
governments. These additional resources may disincentive local tax effort and 
reduce observed tax collection. The substitution effect may be higher among 
local governments with lower levels of expenditure, because of decreasing 
marginal benefits. Secondly, it is possible to reduce this pervasive effect by 
including fiscal effort indicators in transfer allocation formula. Notice that 
fiscal effort is increasing in α , the degree of conditionality on effort of the 
assignment formula. This factor may attenuate the effects of decreasing 
political benefits or effort’s cost.  
 
4. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
 
4.1. Data 
 
In order to identify the relationship between transfers and local fiscal effort 
financial and socioeconomic data from around 1400 Peruvian district 
municipalities is used4. The financial data contains detailed information about 
income sources (taxes, transfers and debt) and expenditures for the years 2000 
and 2001. This data is continuously collected by the National Public 
Accounting Office (“Contaduría Pública de la Nación”). In addition, 
socioeconomic information was obtained from the National Census 1993, 
National Statistics Institute’s population forecasts and poverty maps (see 
Table 1). 
Even though it is compulsory to report budgetary and financial 
information to the Central Government, there is missing information for 
almost 160 municipalities. If there were any systematic difference between the 
observed and missing group, the results would be biased. Nonetheless, 
comparison among both groups using socioeconomic data suggests that they 
are similar and that reporting bias is not a relevant concern (see Appendix A).  
 
4.2. Econometric model 
 
The basic econometric model is defined as follows: 
 
itititit zwxy εβ +++= , 
 
where   is an indicator of fiscal effort (e.g. tax collection per capita),  is 
the amount of transfers received,  is a set of time-invariant individual 
characteristics (e.g. management skills, political background, institutions, 
ity itx
iz
                                                 
4 There are 1818 municipalities in total, 194 at provincial level and 1624 at the district one.  
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fiscal
the model is transformed into a first-
ifference model. This co uration drops out time invariant variables and 
alleviates the omitted variable problem. 
 capacity, etc.) and tw  is set of time-specific effects which affect all 
municipalities in a given period.  
Exploiting the two-period data set, 
d nfig
 
iii xy μβα +Δ+=Δ  
 
The model can be applied to different groups in order to allow a 
differentiated behavior. Considering the possibility that the effect of transfers 
on fiscal effort varies with initial level of local expenditure, a typology of 
muni
 
Figur
 same allocation criteria. Then, the reverse causality 
problem persists and the use of instruments to incorporate exogenous 
riation is required.  
he 
acces
his transfer accounts for 35% 
of lo
In 2000, value added tax decreased significantly due to economic 
recession and so the resources available for municipalities. Political pressure 
cipalities, using the clustering technique, is created (see Table 2). Then, 
the model is applied separately to each subgroup.  
A first approach to the data suggests a negative correlation between 
transfers and tax collection (see Figure 2). However this is not necessarily a 
causal relationship. It may reflect that transfers are allocated to localities 
where tax collection is intrinsically low due to reduced fiscal capacity. This is 
probably true in the Peruvian case where transfers are allocated using 
equalization criteria and are positively correlated to poverty (see Table 3 and 
Figure 3).  Since poorer areas present lower levels of local tax collection (see
e 4), it is possible that the observed negative correlation between transfer 
and tax collection includes the effect of transfers and different fiscal capacity  
This reverse causality complicates the identification of the effect of 
transfer on fiscal effort since it may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimations. The problem does not disappear when taking differences since 
tax collection of poor fiscal capacity municipalities grows slowly and transfers 
increments follow the
va
 
  
4.3. Using the “additional transfer” as an instrument 
 
This paper exploits the occurrence of a quasi experiment as an instrument to 
identify the causal relationship between transfers and fiscal effort. Peruvian 
local governments are highly dependant on transfers from central 
government. Only 34% of the local budget is financed with local taxes. T
s to credit is very low (around 5.5% of total budget). The main source of 
resources for the majority of municipalities is intergovernmental transfers. 
The most important transfer is the Foncomun (“Fondo de Compensación 
Municipal” or Municipal Compensation Fund). T
cal governments’ budget. However it is highly volatile because is 
basically funded by a value added tax sharing.  
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arose to increase the transfers to local governments and an additional transfer 
(“asignación adicional”) was created5.   
The additional transfer was assigned to municipalities that were 
receiving a Foncomun’s transfer less or equal to 25,000 soles per month, 
around US$ 7,300 (see Table 4).  It was valid from August 2000 to December 
2001 and benefited more than half of district municipalities. Among the 
treated group, the additional transfer represented an increase of around 26% 
of the amount received for Foncomun. During 2001, the program represented 
an increment of transfer of S/. 39.9 millions (around US$ 11.6 millions). 
According to the law, the additional transfer should be used only in 
investment. However, in practice conditionality on transfers is not so binding. 
For example, consider the case of Foncomun. In 2000, the Foncomun was 
partially earmarked, 80% was supposed to be allocated to investment 
projects6. However, in practice, monitoring was highly unlikely. Alcázar, 
Lopez-Cáliz et al. (2003) find that only 6% of municipalities has been audited 
or supervised by a central authority. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
financial data from 1998-2001 collected by the central government shows that 
the investment condition was not fulfilled in any year (see Table 5). This 
evidence suggests us that in practice the additional transfer was like an 
unconditional grant. 
We claim that the additional transfer was not related to local fiscal 
capacity and therefore can be used as an instrument for transfer increments. 
As we mentioned, the allocation rule was based on the total amount of 
Foncomun received. The Foncomun is allocated mainly based on child 
mortality, rural and urban population. Then, a poor or rural municipality will 
receive more Foncomun per capita (see Figure 5). However, the data suggests 
that the total amount received depends finally on population size (see Figure 
6 and 7). It is possible then that relatively rich but small localities received low 
levels of Foncomun and were able to access the additional transfer meanwhile 
poor but populated areas did not. This failure on transfer focalization is 
exploited in the identification strategy. 
Furthermore there are no significant differences in treated and non-
treated groups before the additional transfer implementation. The rates of 
poverty and tax collection per capita are similar between municipalities that 
received the additional transfer and municipalities that did not. There are also 
similarities in the degree of urbanization and coverage of water, sanitation 
and electricity services (see Table 6). Furthermore, the distribution functions 
of tax collection per capita among both groups are alike (see Figure 8). The 
level of tax collection is similarly distributed in both treated and untreated 
municipalities and there are not significant differences.  
The main difference between both groups is size of population. This is 
consistent with the explanation that some municipalities received the 
additional transfer because they were relatively small and not because they 
had lower fiscal capacity or tax collection. Since receiving additional transfer 
                                                 
5 Ley N° 27298. 
6 Since 2002, the Foncomun has become an unconditional transfer. 
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is not related to local tax collection and explains transfers increments, it can be 
used as an instrument to incorporate exogenous variation in the empirical 
model. 
Using the additional transfer as a source of exogenous variation, the 
basic model can be redefined as a difference in difference model. In this case, 
the additional transfer is the policy intervention and municipalities which 
received the transfer are the treated group.  The effect of the program is the 
variation on local tax collection. 
 
iii Dy μγα ++=Δ  
 
where  if municipality received additional transfer, 0 otherwise. 1=iD
This method does not allow estimating the elasticity of substitution of 
transfers on fiscal effort ( β ) but only the total effect of transfer increase on 
fiscal effort (γ ). The program impact can be estimated using propensity score 
matching. This estimation method improves the comparability of treated and 
control group and it may reduce any selection bias in the allocation of the 
additional transfer (Heckman et al. 1998). 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1. Instrumental variable estimations 
 
The results confirm the existence of a negative relationship between transfers 
and fiscal effort of local governments. The elasticity of substitution estimated 
using the instrumental variable model is around -1.0. It means that for the 
average municipality, a transfer increment of US$1 causes a US$0.15 
reduction of local taxes.  The empirical result is robust to changes of control 
variable sets and exclusion of extreme cases (see Table 7).  
As previously noticed, in presence of diminishing political benefits, it is 
optimal for the mayor to substitute local taxation by transfers, since the 
former are costly. However, in terms of social welfare this decision is 
probably inefficient and it might reflect the fact that the mayor does not 
internalize costs associated to central government taxes. 
The magnitude of the estimated elasticity of substitution contrasts with 
previous studies that found values of -0.24 and -0.35 (Alvarado 1994; 
Alvarado et al. 2003). The higher currently estimated elasticity is consistent 
with a previous downward bias due to omitted variables positively correlated 
to transfers and negatively correlated to local taxation (e.g. fiscal capacity).  
There is also evidence of a differentiated effect. Municipalities with 
lower levels of expenditure per capita present higher substitution elasticity. 
As long as the initial expenditure increases, the effect becomes smaller and, in 
the high expenditure group, insignificant (see Table 8 and Figure 9). In the 
case of low expenditure group, a US$1 increment of transfers decreases local 
tax collection by US$ 0.28 in the average municipality. The trade-off is lower 
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in the medium expenditure group (only US$ 0.16) and becomes statistically 
non different from zero for local governments with high levels of public 
spending. 
 
5.2. Difference-in-difference estimations 
 
The additional transfer represented a significant increase of transfers among 
the benefited municipalities. In average, transfers increased on 5% meanwhile 
among the non-treated group, transfers decreased on 18%. Tax collection 
variation also differs (see Table 9). Meanwhile the non-treated group 
increased tax collection on almost 27% the increment among the treated group 
was only 6%. This evidence is consistent with a negative relation between 
transfers and fiscal effort. 
In order to obtain more accurate difference-in-difference estimators we 
will use propensity score matching. We preferred this method, instead of 
simpler difference-in-difference estimations, in order to take into account any 
possible differences between both treated and non-treated. 
The procedure implemented is as follow. First, we estimate the 
probability (or propensity scores) of receiving the additional transfer. We 
consider several financial and socioeconomic variables to estimate the 
propensity score (see Appendix B). Then, we match the treated and control 
municipalities using kernel matching. Finally, we estimate the difference in 
difference effect. Since the results are sensible to bandwidth specification, we 
perform a sensitivity analysis using different bandwidth values. 
The results are similar to the obtained with the instrumental variable 
model. The impact of the additional transfer was negative, reducing the local 
tax collection almost 20% in average (see Figure 10). The estimated effect is 
robust to changes in bandwidth values. Furthermore, the effect is also 
differentiated by type of municipality. The negative impact of the transfer is 
higher between low expenditure municipalities. The effect dilutes as long as 
the expenditure level increases (see Figure 11). 
The similarity of treated and control groups and the estimated effects 
suggests that selection bias is not a significant problem. The additional 
transfer was allocated to municipalities with less population. However, the 
poverty and fiscal capacity characteristics were similar. When the indicators 
are scaled by population (e.g. per capita tax collection) the differences 
between treated and control groups disappear. Then, the propensity score 
matching estimates become similar to the instrumental variable models.  
 
5.3. Is this a causal relationship? 
 
There is reasonable evidence that the estimators are consistent and that a 
negative relationship has been identified. Firstly, the use of a two period first-
difference model, equivalent to a fixed effect panel data, reduces the presence 
of omitted variables. Unobservable factors such as fiscal capacity, political 
background, local institutions, managerial skills, etc. may affect significantly 
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the level of local tax collection. Excluding them from a regression may lead to 
inconsistent estimations. Nonetheless, these factors are quite invariable in the 
two-year period of analysis. Moreover, there were not local elections or 
significant changes in local taxes or transfer system besides the additional 
transfer.  
The selected model specification drops out most of the effect of these 
unobserved determinants. It is favorable for identifying the relationship 
between transfers and fiscal effort. However it eliminates the possibility to 
explore their effect. For instance, the model is unable to address the 
importance of fiscal capacity, socioeconomic conditions or political variables. 
In second place, the probable causal reverse problem is addressed using 
the additional transfer as a source of exogenous variation. Reviewing the 
institutional procedure to allocate this transfer shows that it was not related to 
local tax collection but to population size. In addition, both treated and 
untreated groups present similar levels of tax collection per capita and 
poverty index reassuring the presumption that the transfer was distributed 
regardless of these factors. 
 
5.4. Net effect on local governments’ budget constraint 
 
A relevant policy question is to ask if the transfer increased the net 
resources available for local governments.  In order to solve this question, we 
run the following difference-in-difference model  
where 
iik
k
kii zDy μδγα +++=Δ ∑
D  is a dummy variable to identify a municipality that received 
additional transfer and  are control variables (e.g. poverty rate, density, 
population, etc.).  Note that this model is similar to the propensity score 
matching but the parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares. As 
we argued before, the additional transfer is an exogenous variable and the 
selection bias is not a significant problem. Then, it is safe to use least squares. 
As expected, the estimated effect of transfers on local tax is similar to the 
values obtained using the other methods (see Table 10).  
kz
Using the estimated parameters, we predict the growth rate of local tax 
collection for year 2001 with and without additional transfer. Then, we apply 
the estimated growth rates to the previous tax collection base to obtain 
estimations of tax collection levels with and without additional transfer.   This 
is a gross procedure since it assumes that the response of the agents to other 
factors remain similar. However, since the other variables are relatively 
structural and time invariant, we have confidence that the results will not be 
too biased. 
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 11. The estimated 
reduction on local tax collection in 2001 is around S/. 36 millions.  In the same 
period, the amount distributed as additional transfer was S/. 39.9 millions. If 
we consider that the reduction on local tax collection is a point estimate, the 
net change in local governments’ budget is negligible. Furthermore, the 
substitution of local taxation by transfers is mainly explained by reduction on 
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tax collection in local governments with low and medium levels of per capita 
expenditure. These two groups absorb 88% of tax collection reduction and 
also present higher relative reductions. Meanwhile the additional transfer 
reduced tax collection of high expenditure governments in 1.2%, the 
reduction on low and medium expenditure governments was around 5-6%.  
 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Devolving responsibilities to local governments has been considered as a 
mechanism to improve government responsiveness to local needs. However, 
efficiency gains have been contrasted with risk of local capture, corruption 
and higher production costs. This paper explores an additional side effect: 
disincentive of local fiscal effort due to transfers from central government. 
The analytical model shows that in presence of diminishing marginal 
political benefits, transfer increments will induce the mayor to reduce fiscal 
effort. This trade-off will be greater among communities with low levels of 
public expenditure. The identification of the causal relationship is not 
straightforward. Usual econometric estimations face omitted variables and 
reverse causality problems. Due to these problems, estimations would be 
biased and inconsistent.  
This paper exploits panel data specification and a quasi experiment to 
identify the relationship. Using financial and socioeconomic data from about 
1,400 Peruvian local governments, a first-difference instrumental variable 
model is estimated. In addition, propensity score matching is used to address 
possible selection bias and to check the robustness of the findings. 
The results confirm the hypotheses from the analytical model. There is 
evidence of a negative relationship between transfers and fiscal effort. The 
estimated elasticity of substitution is around -1.0.  Moreover, the substitution 
effect is greater among local governments with lower levels of per capita 
expenditure.   
The negative relationship between transfers and fiscal effort has serious 
implications in fiscal decentralization design, especially in the actual Peruvian 
decentralization process. Devolving expenditure responsibilities to sub-
national governments requires providing them enough financial resources. 
Given lack of local fiscal capacity, most of the new expenditures must be 
financed via intergovernmental transfers. As the available evidence suggests, 
fiscal decentralization may reduce local fiscal effort and local tax collection, 
increasing dependence from central government and augmenting aggregate 
fiscal deficit. The effect would be greater among local governments with 
lower levels of per capita expenditure. 
Incorporating an effort-related component to equalization transfers may 
reduce the negative incentives of transfers. For example, fiscal effort 
indicators such as the ratio of actual collected revenues to some measure of 
fiscal capacity can be included in the allocation formula.  
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Figure 3: Transfers and poverty rate 
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Figure 4: Tax collection and poverty rate 
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Figure 5: Foncomun per capita and poverty rate 
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Figure 6: Total Foncomun and population 
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Figure 7: Total Foncomun and poverty rate 
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Figure 8: llection 
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Figure 9: Effect of transfers on local tax collection 
 by type of municipality 
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Figure 10: Impact of additional transfer on local tax collection 
(estimated using propensity score matching) 
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Figure ction  
(estimated using propensity score matching) 
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Table 1: Description of dataset 
Variable Unit Period N Source
1 Directly collected 
resources
Current Nuevos So s 2000, 2001 1391, 1459 National Public 
Accounting Office
2 Municipal local taxes " " " "
3 Foncomun " " " "
4 Canon " " " "
5 Custom rent " " " "
6 Donations " " " "
7 Internal credit " " " "
8 External credit " " " "
9 Received aditional 
transfers
Dummy variable (1 if 
received it, 0 otherwise)
2001 1458 Ministry of 
Economics and 
Finance
10 Population Number of persons 2002 1458 National Statistics 
Institute
11 Urban population " 1993 1367 National Census 
1993
12 Rural population " " " "
13 Size Km2 " " "
14 Poverty index Index 2000 1457 Pov y Map
15 Population without water Percentage " " "
16 Population without 
sanitation
" " " "
17 Population without 
electricity
" " " "
le
ert
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of municipalities by type 
Low Medium High
% Received additional transfer 44.7            63.7            80.4            
Expenditure per capita (S/.) 85.4            155.0          531.9          
Tax collection per capita (S/.) 9.9              19.2            121.2          
Per capita Foncomun 56.1            98.9            259.6          
Local tax / Total expenditure 11.9            12.0            16.4            
Transfers / Total expenditure 84.4            80.9            75.2            
% households without water 37.4            36.2            41.9            
% households without sanitation 76.4            72.3            66.6            
% households without electricity 61.8            60.9            61.9            
Poverty Index (% households poor) 46.4            47.4            45.8            
Population (N° persons) 17,457.6     7,719.3       6,221.6       
Urban density 284.4          404.9          438.5          
Urban population / total population 38.7            39.1            52.2            
N° municipalities 664             571             153             
Per capita expenditure level
Variable
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Table 3: Summary of transfers to district municipalities 
Transfer Revenue source Assignment rule Use restrictions
Foncomun (Fondo de 
Compensación 
Municipal)
Mainly, share in value 
add tax. Other taxes 
such as recreational 
yachts tax, gambling 
tax, etc. also 
contributes but in very 
small amount.
Assigned in two stages. In the first stage is 
assigned among provinces considering 
population size and children mortality rate. In 
the second stage, it is distributed inside the 
province considering urban and rural 
population size. The amount assigned cannot 
be under certain minimum level (around 
US$3300 per month in 2000)
Until 2001, 80% to 
capital expenditures. 
Since 2002 it is an 
unconditional 
transfer.
Canon y Sobrecanon 
1/
Share in profit tax of 
mining companies
Only to municipalities in the region where the 
mine is located. The index is similar to 
Foncomun's but there is not a minimum level.
None
Share in oil sales
Only to municipalities in oil production areas. 
Distribution in two stages. In the first stage is 
distributed between regional governments, 
research centers or universities and local 
governments. In the second stage, it is 
distributed among local governments 
considering mainly geographical size and 
population.
None
Renta de aduanas Share in custom duties
Only to municipalities in provinces with a 
custom. In one case (Provincia de El Callao) it 
is allocated between regional government 
(70%), an educational fund (10%) and local 
governments (20%). In the rest of cases, 50% is 
distributed in equal parts between local 
governments and the remain considering 
population size.
Only in an specific 
case (Provincia de El 
Callao). In the rest of 
provinces there is no 
conditionality.
Vaso de Leche Central government budget
Allocated considering the number of potential 
beneficiaries of the food provision program. depr
Conditioned to 
finance a food 
program. The "Vaso 
 Leche" program 
ovides milk to 
children, pregnant 
women and elders.
1/ This table reflects the situation in the year 2001. There were substantial changes in the year 2002.  
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Table 4: Distribution of additional transfer 
Type Monthly amount received for Foncomun
Monthly additional 
transfer
A 11,000 to 17,000 4,000
B 17,001 to 20,000 3,000
C 20,001 to 23,000 2,000
D 23,001 to 25,000 Variable 1/
1/ Difference between 25,000 and actual transfer.
(In Nuevos Soles)
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Effective use of Foncomun 
(% of total transfer) 
1998 1999 2000 2001
Non-investment 1/ 33.4 34.6 41.8 46.4
Investment 66.6 65.4 58.2 53.6
1/ Includes current expenditures and payment s.
YearType of 
expenditure
 of debt principal and interest  
Table 6: Characteristics of municipalities before additional transfer 
 
 
 
 
Non-treated Treated
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
ta (S/.) 21.7Tax collection per capi            2.6        29.2           8.1        
Urban population / total population 38.2           1.4        42.0           1.0        
Poverty Index (% households poor) 46.1           0.6        47.2           0.5        
% households without water 41.3           1.3        34.5           1.2        
% households without sanitation 77.3           1.1        70.8           1.2        
% households without electricity 61.6           1.4        61.4           1.3        
Population (N° persons) 24,875          2,306  2,434        61         
Variable
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Table 7: Instrumental variable model 
dLog (Local tax per capita) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
dlog (Transfer per capita) -0.925 -0.927 -1.171 55 -1.164 -0.817 -0.797 -0.797 -1.069 -0.986
(0.237)** (0.239)** (0.292)** 6)** (0.285)** (0.222)** (0.221)** (0.221)** (0.261)** (0.254)**
Povert
-1.2
(0.29
y rate 0.329 0.15 63 -0.133 -0.209 -0.209 -0.363 -0.582
(0.197) (0.207) 14) (0.254) (0.217) (0.217) (0.235) (0.264)*
Po
0.1
(0.2
pulation 0 0 0 0 0
(0.000)** 0)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*
Urban densit
(0.00
y -0.0
(0.0
01 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
01) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)*
% urban population 0.272 0.212
(0.110)* (0.098)*
Constant 0.104 -0.051 0.05 67 0.02 0.1 0.234 0.211
(0.032)** (0.089) (0.092) 95) (0.093) (0.031) (0.0 (0.099) (0.107)* (0.106)*
N° obs. 1260 1259 1259 32 1232 1037 10 1036 1013 1013
d(Tax)/d(Transfer) 1/ -0.14 -0.14 -0.18 19 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 5% significant ** 1% significant
In all the models the variable Dlog(transfer per capita) was instrumented using variable itional transfer" (1 if municipality received additi ransfer, 0 otherwise)
 and the remaining control variables.
Models (6) to (10) use sample without extreme values of local tax per capita.
1/ Approximate value obtained multiplying substitution elasticity by average Tax/Transf
0.0
(0.0
12
-0.
"Add
er  
 
0.1190.045 19
99)
36
onal t
 
Table 8: Instrumental variable model by type of municipality 
dlog (Transfer per capita) -1.548 -1.985 -0.759 -1.09 2.233 2.832
(0.423)** (0.522)** (0.312)* (0.392)** (1.223) (1.191)*
Poverty rate 0.142 -0.561 -1.457
(0.478) (0.359) (0.689)*
Population 0 0 0
(0.000)* (0.000)* 0.000
Urban density -0.001 -0.004 -0.023
(0.001) (0.002)* (0.013)
% urban population 0.418 0.295 0.053
(0.182)* (0.172) (0.465)
Constant 0.052 -0.218 0.086 0.243 0.133 0.84
(0.064) (0.161) (0.040)* (0.140) (0.115) (0.369)*
N° obs. 607 590 521 512 132 130
d(Tax)/d(Transfer) 1/ -0.219 -0.281 -0.113 -0.162 0.487 0.618
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 5% significant ** 1% significant
In all t els the variable Dlog(transfer per capita) was instrumented using variable "Additional transfer" 
(1 if m lity received additional transfer, 0 otherwise) and the remaining control variables.
1/ App alue obtained multiplying substitution elasticity by average Tax/Transfer
2/ Typ as constructed using cluster analysis. 
Expenditure per capita 2/dLog (Local tax per capita) Low Medium High
he mod
unicipa
roximate v
ology w  
 
 
Table 9: Tax collection and transfer variation after additional transfer 
 
Var. % Transfers Var. % Local tax collection
Non treated Treated Non treated Treated
Low -0.188 0.065 0.225 0.035
Medium -0.188 0.030 0.345 0.027
High -0.182 0.059 -0.257 0.235
Total -0.188 0.051 0.276 0.063
Per capita 
expenditure level
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Table 10:  Effect of additional transfer on local tax collection 
dLog (Local tax per capita) (1)
Received additional transfer -0.237
(0.055)**
Poverty rate -0.088
(0.242)
Population 0
(0.000)*
Urban density -0.001
(0.001)
% urban population 0.243
(0.106)*
Constant 0.217
(0.087)*
N° obs. 1233
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 5% significant ** 1% significant
Model estimated using least squares.  
 
 
Table 11: Loss on local tax collection due to additional transfer 
With additional 
transfer         
(1)
With t additionalou  
transfer           
(2)
Low 249.4                    262.1                        12.7                   35%
Medium 294.3                    313.4                        19.1                   53%
High 344.5                    348.7                        4.2                     12%
Total 888.2                    924.2                        36.0                   100%
Predicted local tax collection 2001    
(S/. mn)
Level of per 
capita 
Loss due to 
additional 
expenditure transfer        (2) - (1)
loss
% total 
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APPENDIX A: REPORTING SELECTION BIAS 
 
The comparison of socioeconomic information between reporting and 
non-reporting municipalities suggests that there are no significant differences 
among them (see Table A.1). Both groups present similar poverty rates and 
access to basic utilities.  
In order to evaluate any systematic difference in a more rigorous way, a 
probit model was estimated (see Table A.2). This procedure is equivalent to 
the first stage of a Heckman selection-bias model. None of the available 
variables is significant. This evidence rejects the hypothesis of existence of 
selection bias.  
 
Table A.1: Comparison of reporting and non-reporting municipalities 
Reporting Non-reporting Total
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Foncomun 2001 512,768   23,733  414,104   39,853  498,534   21,121  
Population 1999      11,572      1,002        7,393      1,592      10,969         888 
Foncomun 2001 per capita        114.1          3.1        124.8          8.9        115.6          2.9 
Poverty Index (% households          46.7          0.4          46.9          0.9          46.8          0poor) .4 
Malnutrition rate (% children 
under 5)          37.2          0.3          37.3          0.7          37.2          0.3 
% households without water          37.5          0.9          41.6          2.2          38.1          0.8 
% households without 
sanitation          73.6          0.8          76.6          2.0          74.0          0.8 
% households without 
electricity          61.5          0.9          63.3          2.2          61.7          0.9 
Variable
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Table A.2: P formation robit model of probability of reporting in
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foncomun 2001 per capita 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Porverty index 0.734 0.521 0.323 0.042 0.115
(0.527) (0.467) (0.439) (0.410) (0.284)
Malnutrition rate -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
% households without 
er
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002
% hou
sanitation
-0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
% households without 
electricity
-0.001
(0.001)
Constants 1.158 1.146 1.073 1 1.014 1.07 1.106
(0.175)** (0.174)** (0.163)** (0.158)** (0.148)** (0.058)** (0.053)**
Observations 1622 1622 1622 1622 1622 1622 1622
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 5% significant ** 1% significant
Reported financial information
wat
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
seholds without 
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APPENDIX C: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
 
The construction of the propensity scores incorporated the following 
variables: 
 
• Ln tax collection per capita 
• Local tax collection / total expenditure 
• Poverty rate 
• % households without water 
• % households without sanitation 
• % households without electricity 
• Urban density 
• Urban population / total population 
 
The existence of a common support was tested comparing the 
distribution of treated and control observations. The common support is 
broad and includes around 86% of observations (see Figure C.1).  
 
Figure C.1: Distribution and common support of propensity score 
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The average treatment effect was estimated considering different bandwidth 
values. The results are presented in the following table. 
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Table C.1: Propensity Score matching estimates 
 
Bandwidth ATT
0.05 -0.15 -0.27 -0.07
0.10 -0.16 -0.27 -0.08
9 -0.11
-0.11
-0.28 -0.11
-0.28 -0.11
-0.30 -0.10
-0.29 -0.05
-0.21 -0.32 -0.10
0.27 -0.10
0.55 -0.21 -0.30 -0.14
Confidence interval 95% 1/
0.15 -0.18 -0.2
0 -0.19 -0.310.2
0.25 -0.20
0.30 -0.21
0.35 -0.21
0.40 -0.21
0.45
0.50 -0.21 -
0.60 -0.21 -0.30 -0.13
1/ Estimated using boostrapping.  
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